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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEN FIDEL SALAZAR, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
WARDEN, UTAH STATE PRISON, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
Case No. 910533 
Category No. 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the district court's order denying 
petitioner habeas corpus relief in a case involving a conviction 
of first degree murder1, a capital felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the 
district court correctly denied petitioner habeas corpus relief 
based on its determination that petitioner entered his guilty 
plea knowingly and voluntarily and that the trial court complied 
with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting the 
plea. 
"On appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, '[the 
appellate court] survey[s] the record in the light most favorable 
to the findings and judgment; and [the court] will not reverse if 
1
 First degree murder is now called aggravated murder. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1991). 
there is any reasonable basis therein to support the trial 
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be 
granted.'" Medina v. Cook. 779 P. 2d 658 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988)). The appellate court 
reviews the "record as a whole." State v. Maquire, 184 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 39, 40 n.l (Utah April 10, 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
under rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,2 alleging that 
his guilty plea to a charge of first degree murder was not 
knowingly and voluntarily entered and that the trial court failed 
to comply strictly with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, in accepting the plea (R. la-3). The district court 
denied petitioner habeas corpus relief based on its determination 
that petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and 
that the trial court complied with rule 11 in accepting the plea 
(R. 41-44). 
2
 Petitioner filed his petition on June 18, 1991 under 
former rule 65B (R. la-3). The current version of rule 65B 
became effective on September 1, 1991. Although the district 
court signed its ruling denying the petition on November 7, 1991, 
it applied the former rule (R. 41). 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its written order, the district court made the 
following pertinent findings of fact: 
2. [T]he petition[er] entered a plea of 
guilty to the offense charged [first degree 
murder] on September 7, 1989. 
3. [T]he plea of guilty entered by the 
petitioner was pursuant to a plea negotiation 
and . . . a statement of petitioner was 
prepared by defense counsel and was executed 
by petitioner at the time the plea of guilty 
was entered. 
4. [T]he evidence shows that prior to the 
entry of the plea of guilty defense counsel 
reviewed the written statement with 
petitioner, Salazar; . . . the elements and 
facts of the crime were explained to Salazar; 
[and] the constitutional rights of Salazar 
were contained in said statement and 
explained to Salazar as were the negotiations 
of the parties for the plea entered. 
5. The evidence further shows that a dialog 
[sic] was conducted between the Court and 
Salazar at the time the plea of guilty was 
entered by which the Court reviewed the 
contents of the written statement including 
the rights of Salazar, the crime charged, the 
possible punishments and the plea 
negotiation. 
6. [T]he plea statement set forth the crime 
of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First 
Degree[,] and . . . Salazar knew the crime 
charged, the elements and basis thereof and 
the possible penalty that could be imposed by 
the Court. 
7. Salazar was aware of and knew that the 
plea negotiations included the fact that the 
State of Utah would not present evidence nor 
request imposition of the death penalty in 
exchange for the guilty plea of Salazar. 
8. [T]he facts presented herein establishes 
3 
[sic] that the Court complied with the 
requirements of Rule 11[,] Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and that the record was 
sufficient to establish that Salazar was 
fully advised by his counsel and by the 
Court• 
(R. 42-43) (a copy of the court's ruling is contained in Appendix 
A)-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner fails to demonstrate that there is no 
reasonable basis for the district court's refusal to grant him 
habeas corpus relief. Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989). 
In determining that the trial court had complied with rule 11 in 
taking the plea and that the plea was knowing and voluntary, the 
district court correctly referred to petitioner's written plea 
statement, signed and received at the time of his plea, in which 
petitioner acknowledged that he understood the elements and facts 
of the crime charged, the minimum and maximum sentence for that 
crime, and the nature of the plea bargain. 
Therefore, the district court's ruling should be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE IS 
NO REASONABLE BASIS TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS 
"On appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, '[the 
appellate court] survey[s] the record in the light most favorable 
to the findings and judgment; and [the court] will not reverse if 
4 
there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's 
refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'" 
Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989) (quoting Bundv v. 
DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988)). Without referring to this 
standard of review, petitioner asks this Court to reverse the 
district court's denial of his habeas petition. Because 
petitioner fails to show that there is no reasonable basis for 
the district court's ruling, this Court should affirm. 
Petitioner argues that the district court should have 
granted his petition because it had not strictly complied with 
rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in taking his guilty 
plea, thus resulting in a plea that was not knowing and 
voluntary.3 He alleges the trial court failed to conduct an 
adequate colloquy with him in three areas: (1) the elements and 
facts of the crime charged; (2) the minimum and maximum sentence 
for that crime; and (3) the nature of the plea bargain. Although 
it is not entirely clear from his brief, petitioner appears to 
assume correctly that, in a habeas proceeding under former rule 
65B(i), he had to show a constitutional violation (as opposed to 
a mere violation of rule 11) in the plea process. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(i)(l); Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 80, 85 (Utah 1983) 
(accepting without qualification the state's position that only 
claims of a substantial denial of state or federal constitutional 
rights may be adjudicated in a rule 65B(i) proceeding). In 
3
 The same court that took petitioner's plea considered his 
habeas petition. 
5 
short, he had to show that his plea was not knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-
13 (Utah 1987) . 
Reviewing the record as a whole, State v. Maquire, 184 
Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 40 n.l (Utah April 10, 1992), there is a 
reasonable basis for the district court's denial of the habeas 
petition. When the court took petitioner's plea, it asked him 
whether he had read and understood the "Defendant's Statement" 
(hereafter "affidavit" — a copy of which is contained in 
Appendix B) he was to sign; petitioner responded that he had read 
it and understood it (R. 22). Maquire makes clear that a written 
affidavit which "was read, understood, and acknowledged by 
defendant and the court" is properly part of "the record" for 
purposes of determining rule 11 compliance and whether the plea 
was knowing and voluntary. Maquire, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. 
A. Elements and Facts of the Crime 
With respect to the elements and facts of the crime 
charged, the following exchange between the court and petitioner 
occurred: 
[The Court]: Now, the State is required to 
prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Have you and your counsel discussed that 
fact? 
[Petitioner]: Yes, Your Honor. 
[The Court]: Has counsel explained to you 
the elements of the crimes involved here, and 
the proof necessary, that the State must 
produce to prove a charge against you under 
those elements? 
[Petitioner]: Yes, Your Honor. 
6 
[The Court]: All right. Mr. Bradshaw 
[petitioner's counsel], have you gone over 
with Mr. Salazar, thoroughly, the elements 
involved in both these, in particular, in the 
Count I Criminal Homicide Murder in the First 
Degree charge? 
Mr. Bradshaw: Yes, Your Honor; both Ms. 
Palacios and I have reviewed with Mr. Salazar 
what the elements the State would be required 
to prove — the degree of proof they would 
have to meet. It's my belief that Mr. 
Salazar understands those. 
The Court: That also your belief, Mrs. 
Palacios? 
Ms. Palacios: Yes, Your Honor, it is. 
The Court: Mr. Salazar, you agree with that? 
[Petitioner]: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 
(R. 22-23). The affidavit contained the following language 
concerning the elements and facts for first degree murder: 
I have received a copy of the Information 
against me, I have read it, and I understand 
the nature and elements of the offense for 
which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime of which I am 
charged is [sic] as follows: Defendant 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death 
of Charlotte Montoya under the following 
circumstance: the defendant has previously 
been convicted of a Second Degree Felony 
involving use or threat of violence to a 
person. 
My conduct, and the conduct of other 
persons for which I am criminally liable, 
that constitutes the elements of the crime 
charged is as follows: On or about March 28, 
1988, Ben F. Salazar choked Charlotte Montoya 
and caused knowingly or intentionally her 
death. 
(R. 13-14). Although the affidavit's recitation of the elements 
and the facts could have been better, it satisfies the 
7 
requirement of Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313, that the affidavit 
"contain both a statement of the elements of the offenses and a 
synopsis of the defendant's acts that establish the elements of 
the crimes charged." 
Therefore, there is a reasonable basis in the record 
for the district court's rejection of petitioner's claim that he 
was not adequately informed of and did not understand the 
elements and facts of the crime. 
B. Minimum and Maximum Sentence 
The affidavit contains the following statement 
concerning the minimum and maximum sentence for first degree 
murder: 
I know that the maximum possible sentence 
may be imposed upon my plea of guilty, and 
that sentence may be for life or death. I 
also know that I may be ordered by the court 
to make restitution to any victim or victims 
of my crimes. 
(R. 15). During the plea colloquy, the following exchange 
occurred: 
The Court: Well, have your attorneys gone 
over with you[] the possible penalties that 
can be imposed by the Court for the crime of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First 
Degree? 
[Petitioner]: Yes, Your Honor. 
(R. 26). Again, although the affidavit could have stated it more 
clearly, it adequately advised petitioner of the minimum sentence 
(life) and maximum sentence (death) for first degree murder. See 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313 ("affidavit should clearly state the 
allowable punishment for the crimes charged"); Utah Code Ann. § 
8 
76-3-207 (1990) (amended 1991, 1992). 
Therefore, the district court had a reasonable basis 
for rejecting petitioner's claim that he was not adequately 
informed and did not understand the minimum and maximum sentence 
for the crime charged. 
C. Knowledge of Plea Bargain 
The affidavit states that "[t]he State agrees to submit 
no evidence in aggravation at the penalty phase. . . . My plea of 
guilty is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of 
this plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea 
Agreement within this affidavit" (R. 13, 16). Regarding 
petitioner's understanding of the plea agreement the following 
exchange occurred at the time of his plea: 
[The Prosecutor]: [0]n the statement that 
[petitioner] is signing, says [sic] [:] "The 
State agrees to submit n: evidence of 
aggravation [at] the penalty phase." We do 
not intend to offer evidence on the question 
of life versus death. We made it clear, 
we're not pursuing the Death Penalty; but if 
there is a question on what he should be 
sentenced to, we certainly want an 
opportunity to be heard, and I think some of 
the aggravating factors in this case would be 
relevant to the Court in trying to impose a 
sentence. 
[Defense Counsel]: That was our intent is 
that — 
[The Prosecutor]: The way this was worded. 
[Defense Counsel]: —what Ben understands 
is, that the State is not seeking the Death 
Penalty, although they do intend to submit 
the transcript as they did and argue that. 
Do you understand that, Ben? 
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[Petitioner]: Yeah. 
[The Prosecutor]: We intend to argue in the 
penalty phase he should spend the rest of his 
life in prison and I think some of the 
evidence from the Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript, together with some other matters, 
should be submitted to the Court. 
[The Court]: I understand. Does the Defense 
under[stand] that? 
[Petitioner]: Well, if they're goin' to go 
for that, I'll just go for the Death Penalty. 
I'm not goin' to spend the rest of my life in 
prison. Not from the experience I had with 
the jailers, and the Halfway Houses, and 
stuff like that. 
[Defense Counsel]: Could I have a moment, 
Your Honor? 
[The Court]: Certainly. 
(WHEREUPON an off the record conference was 
held at side-bar between the attorney's [sic] 
and their client) 
[Defense Counsel]: Ben, at this point, 
having heard that the State intends to 
introduce evidence and argue for Life 
Imprisonment, while not arguing for the Death 
Penalty[,] do you still wish to go ahead with 
the Plea Negotiations as we have done thus 
far? 
[Petitioner]: Yes. 
(R. 29-31). Based upon the foregoing, the district court 
reasonably found that petitioner "was aware of and knew that the 
plea negotiations included the fact that the State of Utah would 
not present evidence nor request imposition of the death penalty 
in exchange for [petitioner's] guilty plea" (R. 42). See 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313 (the details of any plea bargain should 
be set forth in the affidavit). 
10 
In sum, petitioner fails to show that there is no 
reasonable basis to support the district court's denial of his 
habeas petition on the ground that the court complied with rule 
11 and that petitioner knowingly entered his plea. Accordingly, 
viewing the record as a whole and in the light most favorable to 
the findings and judgment of the district court, Maauire, 184 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40 n.l; Medina, 779 P.2d at 658, this Court 
should affirm the denial of the petition. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas 
petition. ZL^— 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this //^tlay of May, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON V 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was hand-delivered to Joseph C. 
Fratto, Jr., Attorney for Petitioner, 431 South 300 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this /f^ay of May, 1992. 
flj*U*cJL K/5 . ^zrjtteryuftzv 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
WALTER R. ELLETT, Bar No. 0980 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEN FIDEL SALAZAR, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Petitioner, OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING WRIT 
) OF HABEAS CORPUS 
-vs-
 } 
WARDEN, UTAH STATE PRISON, ' Case No. 910903891HC 
Respondent. Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
) 
The above matter come on for hearing before the Honorable Richard H. 
Moffat on September 17 and 18,1991 upon the petition of Ben Fidel Salazar for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner appeared in person and by Joseph C. 
Fratto, Jr. his attorney. Respondent was represented by Walter R. Ellett, Chief 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney - Justice Division. The Court dismissed the 
petitioners motion to withdraw his plea of guilty in the underlying criminal matter 
and having determined that this Habeas Corpus petition could be heard pursuant 
to Rule 65 (b)(i) Utah Rule of Civil Procedure and the Court having received 
evidence and having heard arguments of counsel and considers the legal 
authorities cited by counsel and being fully advised in the premises does now 
enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The petitioner is presently in the custody of the Warden, Utah State 
Prison, having been sentenced by this Court to a term of life in prison as 
KOV - 7 I.- ; l 
& CjfiffLp& 
.?. ; ;d ' ] 
provided by law for the crime of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a 
Capitol Offense, said sentence having been made on October 12, 1989. 
2. That the petition entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged on 
September 7,1989. 
3. That the plea of guilty entered by the petitioner was pursuant to a plea 
negotiation and that a statement of petitioner was prepared by petitioner's 
defense counsel and was executed by petitioner at the time the plea of guilty 
was entered. 
4. That the evidence shows that prior to the entry of the plea of guilty 
defense counsel reviewed the written statement with the petitioner, Salazar; that 
the elements and facts of the crime were explained to Salazar; that the 
constitutional rights of Salazar were contained in said statement and explained 
to Salazar. Further that the penalty for the crime charged was explained to 
Salazar as were the negotiations of the parties for the plea entered. 
5. The evidence further shows that a dialog was conducted between the 
Court and Salazar at the time the plea of guilty was entered by which the Court 
reviewed the contents of the written statement including the rights of Salazar, the 
crime charged, the possible punishments and the plea negotiation. 
6. That the plea statement set forth the crime of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the First Degree and that Salazar knew the crime charged, the 
elements and basis thereof and the possible penalty that could be imposed by 
the Court. 
7. That Salazar was aware of and knew that the plea negotiations 
included the fact that the State of Utah would not present evidence nor request 
imposition of the death penalty in exchange for the guilty plea of Salazar. 
8. That the facts presented herein establishes that the Court complied 
with the requirements of Rule 11 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the 
record was sufficient to establish that Salazar was fully advised by his counsel 
and by the Court. 
9. That the services of defense counsel for and on behalf of the petitioner 
Salazar was effective and appropriate and that Salazar was represented and 
assisted In a manner consistent with constitutional guarantees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That this Court has jurisdiction to hear and rule upon the petition for 
habeas corpus herein. 
2. That the petitioner Salazar was afforded efficient and effective 
~~: stance of counsel in all stages of the proceedings in the criminal matter 
before this court. 
3. That the plea of guilty entered by Salazar was a voluntary and 
intelligent choice by Salazar and that the same was entered knowingly and 
voluntanlv t Salazar. 
-' ~ nat Salazar entered his plea of guilty after having been advised of the 
constitutional rights he would give up, the nature of the crime to which he was 
entered his plea of guilty, the possible penalties that could be imposed, the 
penalty that had been recommended by the prosecution, and after a 
determination by the Court as to the absence of any inducements to influence 
Salazar's plea; and that the Court complied with the requirements of Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
5. That the petition of the petitioner Salazar for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
should be denied. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the 
Court enters the following Order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
- wG43 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Writ of Habeas Corpus was 
delivered to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., Attorney for Petitioner Ben Fidel Salazar at 
431 South 300 East, #101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the day of 
October, 1991. 
salazar.doc 
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APPENDIX B 
Third Juuicia! D;s:r;ct 
SEP " 7 1989 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D^^*^i/\SgjQ^0 
STATE OP UTAH 
KECC'UNTM 
THE STATE OF OTAH, 
Plaintiff 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
v. 
BEN FIDEL SALAZAR, Criminal No. 881991356FS 
Defendant. 
COME NOW, BEN FIDEL SALAZAR, the defendant in this case and 
hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crime: 
CRIME DEGREE PUNISHMENT (Min/Max) 
A. Criminal Homicide Capital Offense Life or Death 
Murder in the First 
Degree 
The State agrees to submit no evidence in aggravation at the 
penalty phase. 
I have received a copy of the Information against me, I 
have read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the 
offense for which I am pleading guilty. 
O.G13 
The elements of the crime of which I am charged is as 
follows: Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of 
Charlotte Montoya under the following circumstance: the defendant 
has previously been convicted of a* Second Degree Felony involving 
use or threat of violence to a person. 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime 
charged is as follows: On or about March 28, 1988, Ben F. Salazar 
choked Charlotte Montoya and caused knowingly or intentionally her 
death. 
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me* 
2. I have not waived my right to counsel, 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the charge, my 
rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my plea 
of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney 
is FRANCES M. PALACIOS and JAMES C. BRADSHAW and I have had an 
opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights and the 
consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney, 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
- 2 -
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6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them 
cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to 
have my witnesses .subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court 
upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be drawn 
against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me 
I need only plead "not guilty11 and the matter will be set for trial, 
at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would have 
the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of Utah and that if 
I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs 
would be paid by the State. 
10. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be 
imposed upon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for life or 
death. I also know that I may be ordered by the court to make 
restitution to any victim or victims of my crimes. 
- 3 -
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11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that 
if I am on probation, parole or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded 
guilty, tiy plea in the present action may result in consecutive 
sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am 
waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the 
preceding paragraphs. 
13. My plea of guilty is the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties 
and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in 
the Plea Agreement within this affidavit# 
14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the 
judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe that court may do are also not binding on the court. 
15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any 
kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises 
except, those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement, 
have been made to me. 
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16. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this affidavit. I do 
not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are 
correct* 
17. I am satisfied with the advise and assistance of my 
attorneys. 
18. I am 50 years of age; I have attended school through 
the o gradeAand I can read and understand the English language. 
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or 
intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made. I am not 
presently under the influence of any drugs, medication or 
intoxicants. 
19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this f ^ day of September, 1989. 
BEN FIDEL S ALA Z ART 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for BEN FIDEL SALAZAR, the 
defendant above, and that we know he has read the statement or 
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that I have read it to him and I have discussed it with him and 
believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is 
mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and 
belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime 
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are 
correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and 
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
Aa^, 
FRANCES M. PALA€IOS 
Attorney for? Defendant 
J^MES C. BRADSHAW 
ttorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against BEN FIDEL SALAZAR, defendant. I have reviewed this 
statement of the defendant and find that the declarations, including 
the elements of the offense of the charges and the factual synopsis 
of the defendants criminal conduct which constitutes the offense 
are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion 
to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the 
attached plea agreement or as supplemented on record before the 
court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would 
support the conviction of defendant for the offense for which the 
pleas are entered and acceptance of the pleas would serve the public 
interest• 
<4fj^ 
tNI'E JONES 
Prosecuting Attorney 
4f><*4S 
Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and certification, the court finds the defendant's plea of guilty is 
freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the 
defendant's plea of guilty to the charge set forth in the statement 
be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this V7 day of September, 1989. 
OFPAT 
ct Court Judge 
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